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Scepticism And The Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology In Time
1. Dimensions of Socialization:
We tend to think of the socialness of social epistemology largely in terms of a lateral
expansion across social space. The expansion shifts the philosophical focus from the
lone individual of so much traditional epistemology—the individual who wonders
whether he knows this is really his hand before him, and so on—to his relations with
his fellow subjects, his epistemic interactions with them, even his epistemic
interdependence with them. The interest in epistemic interdependence brings
divisions of epistemic labour centre-stage (as the explosion in the literature on
testimony in recent years bears witness) and further establishes a recognized
theoretical space for insights about how justification (for instance, justification for a
scientific theory) can be dispersed across a whole epistemic community, with the
consequence that it makes sense sometimes to regard that whole community as the
subject of the knowledge, and perhaps no individual at all.1 This kind of socialization
of epistemology, then, brings with it a new, less individualistic conception of
epistemic subjects. No longer conceived as lone individuals whose interactions with
other individuals are epistemically incidental, we think of them as fundamentally,
naturally, placed in relations of epistemic interdependence. Let us call this socialized
conception of epistemic subjects, the Abstracted Social Conception. It marks the anti-
individualist moment in epistemology.
The conception remains highly abstracted—appropriately for certain purposes.
The social relations in which epistemic subjects are conceived as standing are
relations between finite knowers and inquirers conceived as bearers of reasons,
producers of evidence, seekers of information, conveyors of knowledge, and so on.
                                                
1 For an early case for the view that justification can be dispersed in the scientific community,
see John Hardwig, ‘Epistemic Dependence’, Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985), 335-349. Lynn
Hankinson Nelson has argued for the view that the scientific community is the subject of
scientific knowledge. See her Who Knows? From Quine to Feminist Empiricism
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).
2These knowers and inquirers are not conceived as standing in relations of social
identity and power. Categories of identity and power are only relevant for certain
sorts of philosophical question, and those operating with the Abstracted Social
Conception are not on the whole aiming to raise them. On the other hand, the
Abstracted Social Conception doesn’t easily allow such questions to come into view
as genuinely epistemological questions, for issues involving identity and power tend
to appear as issues for the sociology of knowledge alone so long as philosophy insists
upon the Abstracted Social Conception. The two conceptions are not really all that far
apart, however. A pregnant distinction that often features in the literature is that
between layman and expert. One of the things that makes this distinction interesting is
that it can be taken as a purely epistemic distinction, so that we conduct our debates
about it in somewhat rationally idealized terms, yet it can also be taken as a
distinction between two social identities where there are relations of power that hold
between the two parties. A layperson’s relationship to an expert does not have to
involve any significant power relation, in the sense of a relationship of power that
affects their interaction or impinges on the rationality of their exchange. As John
Hardwig has pointed out, in very large and complex scientific projects where there is
a marked division of epistemic labour among the contributing scientific communities,
it makes sense to regard all the contributing individuals as at once experts vis-à-vis
their own contribution and laypersons vis-à-vis the contributions of others.2 In such a
scenario, what relations of identity and power there may be between different groups
of scientists may not give rise to any epistemologically compelling issues. But, then
again, they might. In a scenario where one set of contributors happens to enjoy more
professional esteem than others (perhaps, simply, they are operating under the
auspices of an especially powerful institution) there could easily arise the sort of
mingling of power with norms of inquiry that is not easy to disentangle. When this
happens, it becomes part and parcel of the scientific inquirer’s requisite epistemic
virtues—possessed either by individuals or possibly only by the community—to
reliably succeed in spotting research decisions that are too much driven by
professional or institutional power. When social epistemologists talk of experts and
laypersons, then, they are already flirting with a more fully socialized conception of
epistemic subjects than the Abstracted Social Conception itself allows for.
                                                
2 Hardwig (1985).
3If we want epistemology to account for the human epistemic predicament,
then we need to have available a conception of epistemic subjects as required to
overcome or negotiate certain entanglements of reason and power, because it is an
essential feature of human inquirers that they operate in a context in which such
entanglements can arise. We might call such a conception the Situated Social
Conception, as it conceives epistemic subjects and their interactions as situated in a
context of social identity and power.3 For any given project in social epistemology,
then, we need to be reflective about which conception of epistemic subjects suits our
philosophical purposes—reflective, that is, about which degree of abstraction is
appropriate for the issues we want to bring out. Simply sticking to the standard
Abstracted Social Conception may occlude ethical and political aspects of epistemic
practice that are worth our attention; then again, attempts to embrace a Situated Social
Conception may be pointless if relations of identity and power are irrelevant to the
issue we are pursuing. It’s a judgement about horses for courses, so, as a matter of
good philosophical method, we need to have the different options reflectively
available to the philosophical imagination. The picture of epistemic subjects presented
by the Situated Social Conception is less abstracted than that presented in the
Abstracted Social Conception, but it is still an abstraction, as befits the philosophical
purpose. It represents epistemic subjects not in their personal detail but as variously
instantiating one or another (perhaps complex) social type. If the Abstracted Social
Conception marks the moment of rebellion against excessive individualism in
epistemology, then the Situated Social Conception marks the moment of rebellion
against excessive rational idealization.
I have argued elsewhere for the importance of the Situated Social Conception
for certain philosophical purposes, and in particular I have argued that there are issues
of justice and injustice in our everyday epistemic interactions, notably testimonial
interactions, which cannot come to light unless we adopt that more fully socialized
                                                
3 The idea of the socially situated subject is a cornerstone of feminist thinking in
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Donna Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege
of Partial Perspective’, Feminist Studies 14/3 (1988) 575-99; reprinted in Evelyn Fox Keller
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4conception.4 For present purposes, however, the Abstracted Social Conception is
appropriate, as my aim is to show how expanding not only across social space but
also across time can be a powerful epistemological resource. We should distinguish
between two sorts of temporal expansion: expansion across real time (including
historical time), and expansion across the quasi-fictional time that is at work in
genealogical method. I shall make a case for the philosophical fruitfulness of
expanding over genealogical time, and my specific aim will be to show how the
genealogical method can support and augment certain socializing arguments against
scepticism. (The genealogical story I shall use is that given by Edward Craig in his
book, Knowledge and The State of Nature—hence the appropriateness here of the
Abstracted Social Conception, for in so far as there are any social types in the State of
Nature, their social identities do not figure in the explanatory purpose that this
genealogy aims to achieve.5) I shall make my case by reference to an argument
recently put forward by Michael Williams, which employs a ‘default-and-challenge’
model of justification to make a diagnostic case against scepticism. And I will
develop Craig’s ‘practical explication’ of the concept of knowledge in relation to
three aspects of the default and challenge model—its admixture of internalist and
externalist features; its contextualism; and its anti-sceptical impetus—and so augment
the socialized anti-sceptical case mounted by Williams. I hope in this way to illustrate
the philosophical usefulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the
social space of other epistemic subjects, but also vertically in the temporal dimension.
2. Default-and-challenge: Socializing Justification
In ‘Reconciling Responsibility and Reliability’6, Michael Williams explores the anti-
sceptical impetus of a certain model of justification that is found in Robert Brandom’s
                                                
4 See my Epistemic Injustice: Power and The Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007).
5 Edward Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature. An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
6 Michael Williams, ‘Reconciling Responsibility and Reliability’, Philosophical Papers,
March 2008 [pp-pp?]. (Originally delivered as part of a Symposium on ‘Expanding
5work under the name of ‘default-and-challenge’. It is an entitlement conception of
justification, according to which we are entitled to assume our faculties are
functioning correctly so long as there are no reasons to suspect otherwise. Williams’
paper has two aims. Firstly, he wants to ‘incorporate reliabilist insights within a
fundamentally deontological framework’ [draft p.11], where the key reliablist insight
he has in mind is that many accounts of knowledge vastly over-intellectualize what it
takes to know something, and simply do not square with the spontaneous and
unreflective character of our most basic forms of knowledge, notably, perception. If
there is to be a satisfactory responsibilism that presents a unified account of
knowledge, it will have to avoid such intellectualism. And, secondly, he wants to
show how such a responsibilism can, by the same token, deflect scepticism. The
problems of intellectualism and sceptical challenge, he argues, have a common
solution, for one and the same excessively internalist, mentalistic conception of
justification is their common root.
Williams traces a dominant internalist conception of justification back to
Chisholm, and the model he finds in Chisholm’s writing is one in which justification
constitutes a kind of ‘positive authorization’ which, in Chisholm, is linked to a
foundationalist structure with error-proof sensory experiences at the bottom, so that
the whole structure is designed in the foundationalist style to stave off sceptical
challenge. Looking to Sellars’ critical analysis of this sort of view and its dependence
on notions of the Given, Williams argues that the positive authorization conception
seriously exaggerates what is needed to vindicate the idea that epistemic subjects
achieve justification by acting in the light of epistemic rules, as opposed to merely
conforming to them. We can achieve a picture of subjects acting in the light of
normative rules, without being compelled to add that rules should be construed as
imperatival in form, or that justification flows upwards in the system from a
foundation of error-proof self-addressed ‘reports’ of experience. Williams continues
in the Sellarsian idiom by taking up a distinction Sellars makes between ‘ought-to-do’
rules, which are imperatival in form, and ‘ought-to-be’ rules, which are not. These so
                                                                                                                                           
Epistemology’, APA Pacific Division Meeting, Spring 2007—the present paper grew out of
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6called ‘ought-to-be’ rules effectively set conditions of entitlement in the ‘default-and-
challenge’ mould. In Williams’ example:
For me to see, and not merely think that I see, that there is a rabbit in the garden, all
sorts of conditions must be met. Some concern me: I must be of sound mind, paying
attention, capable of recognizing what is going on, and so forth. Others concern the
object and its situation: the animal has to be a rabbit and not a stuffed toy, the light
must be good enough to make out the shape of the dark patch in the middle of the
lawn, and so on. If these conditions are not met, I won’t be in a position to see that
there is a rabbit in the garden [draft p.16].
What default-and-challenge achieves for us is the desired admixture of
internalist and externalist insights. In order to count as acting in the light of a rule (in
order to count as epistemically justified) the well-trained subject might, depending on
the context, need only to be counterfactually sensitive to lapses in the conditions
required for taking the deliverances of her faculties for granted. As Williams puts it,
‘Our acceptance of an ought-to-be “rule” consists principally in our disposition to
acknowledge the exceptions, and to respond appropriately’ [draft p.24]. In sum, the
well-trained subject may take her sensory experiences at face value, so long as there
are no reasons not to. In doing this she is following rules of justification, acting in the
light of them but not self-consciously. Thus the externalist aspect of default-and-
challenge that sets it apart from any positive authorization model. Yet, if
appropriately challenged, she does have a standing obligation to produce a
justification, and if she cannot, then she is revealed as lacking entitlement to her
belief.7 Thus the internalist aspect of default-and-challenge that qualifies Williams’s
position as a form of responsibilism.
                                                
7 Note that Brandom himself is ready to go a step further in the externalist direction than
Williams is willing to. In Articulating Reasons he embraces reliabilism’s ‘Founding Insight’
and allows that, for instance, an expert in distinguishing Toltec from Aztec potsherds can
know whether a shard is one or the other even if she cannot say how she does it. Williams
differs, thus maintaining a stronger internalism in his responsibilist position. (Robert
Brandom, Articulating Reasons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) ch.3, esp.
98-99.)
7Williams also argues that seeing justification as conforming to a default-and-
challenge structure can help fend off scepticism. As ever, he distinguishes Agrippan
from Cartesian forms of sceptical challenge. Agrippan scepticism imposes an endless
demand for further justifications, so that it threatens to expose either regress or
circularity in the series of justifications we may offer, or else a plain unjustified
assumption somewhere in our reasoning. Cartesian scepticism effectively exploits
issues of underdetermination by positing sceptical scenarios which he claims, for all
we know, we might be in. Williams’ focus is on the Agrippan style sceptic, and he
argues that the Agrippan is committed to the familiar, mentalistic and so excessively
internalist model of justification that conceives being guided by norms or rules as
always a matter of self-conscious obedience to self-addressed imperatives—positive
authorization. What the default-and-challenge model furnishes is an account of
justification—entitlement—that makes no such requirement. By contrast, what
default-and-challenge obliges the individual subject to do is something negative:
don’t take your experiences at face value if the default condition is lapsed. A subject
who is entirely successful with respect to that negative task may well not be able to
answer the Agrippan sceptic—but so much the worse for the sceptic. The standing
obligation to come up with reasons when challenged only holds for challenges to
which one’s interlocutor is entitled. Introducing the term ‘default-and-challenge’,
Brandom puts the point like this:
Claims such as ‘There have been black dogs’ and ‘I have ten fingers’ are ones to
which interlocutors are treated as prima facie entitled. They are not immune to doubt
in the form of questions about entitlement, but such questions themselves stand in
need of some sort of warrant or justification. Entitlement is, to begin with, a social
status that a performance or commitment has within a community… The model
presented here has what might be called a default and challenge structure of
entitlement.8
The Agrippan sceptic, then, is presenting unwarranted challenges, and so our
failure to meet those challenges signifies nothing. The sceptic is thus revealed as
missing the point, for she tries to compel the individual subject to dig deeper and
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8deeper into his individual epistemic resources, furnishing reason upon reason for his
belief—but this is simply the wrong place to look for his status as justified in
believing what he believes. The Agrippan demands to be shown a justificational
stopping point somewhere in the depths of the individual subject, and her mistake is
that justification is not to be found deep in the individual but rather on the surface of
something irreducibly social, namely, the subject’s ability to meet the challenges
properly brought in that context by others in the epistemic community.
Williams focuses on the mentalistic nature and extreme internalism of the
model of justification that both polarizes reliabilism and responsibilism and hands the
sceptic a stick to beat us with. But I think we should most of all emphasize its
individualism, for it is the individualism that underpins both the mentalistic and the
extreme internalist character of the mistaken model of justification that Williams
rightly diagnoses in the sceptic. Given a general assumption of epistemic
individualism, one easily sees how it can seem natural to assume that the individual is
the source of all justification for her belief, and that the place to look is (where else?)
in her mental states. Thus the mentalism. Further, if even the subject herself cannot
find a justification in her psychology, then how can she count as possessing a
justification at all? Thus the extreme internalism. I think, then, that once we focus on
the anti-sceptical energy that default-and-challenge clearly contains, we find that
energy to be located most fundamentally in its sociality (and so, to relate back to the
terminology I introduced earlier, in its implicit insistence on the Abstracted Social
Conception of epistemic subjects). For it is the sociality that effects the crucial shift in
rational obligation away from the individual alone and into the epistemic social body,
to which the individual of course belongs. It is this natural division of justificatory
labour that relieves the individual believer of the burden of accessing the kind of
justification that the Agrippan sceptic demands.
The Agrippan, who presses and presses for evermore justifications, is thus
revealed as making a profound mistake at both the level of epistemic practice and the
level of epistemology. She fails to adhere to socially established norms of challenge, a
mistaken practice that exposes her false theory of justification. But what of the
Cartesian sceptic? Williams thinks the Cartesian, whose signature is of course the sort
of madcap sceptical scenarios we all know and love, cannot be confined in the same
9way. But why not? If the context sensitive norms of challenge can reveal Agrippan
challenges as mistaken, then why not Cartesian challenges too? Now that we have
identified the sociality of default-and-challenge as fuelling the anti-sceptical work,
surely it is clear that the Cartesian invocation of sceptical scenarios is a style of
challenge every bit as misguided as the Agrippan style?
Williams does not think the Cartesian is much affected by the sort of
diagnostic argument recounted so far, but I think there is at least some mileage in it,
for not only the Agrippan but the Cartesian too presses his case in a way that is not
sanctioned by socially established norms of challenge, and his practice reflects his
adherence to a false philosophy of justification. It is true, however, that this diagnosis
on its own cannot be as satisfying as in the Agrippan case, because the Cartesian is so
strongly distinguished by the particular sort of demand that he makes—demands for
absolute certainty that crucially play on issues of underdetermination. Consequently,
the socializing move that marks out default-and-challenge does not go to the heart of
the matter as it does in the Agrippan case. (We can perhaps imagine a Cartesian
sceptic a good deal less individualistic than that created by Descartes, who told us he
couldn’t care less whether the indubitability he demands comes from within the
individual subject or from the social epistemic body, so long as the requisite certainty
was achieved.)
In respect of the Cartesian sceptic, then, Williams looks to the central anti-
sceptical argument of Unnatural Doubts9, namely, the argument that the Cartesian
sceptic is committed to ‘epistemological realism’ and epistemological realism is false.
The Cartesian sceptic’s challenges concern something called ‘knowledge of the
external world’ or ‘empirical knowledge’, as if these were respectable theoretical
categories; but they are not. They are far too internally diverse to be so regarded, and
in fact have no more integrity than a category such as ‘knowledge of things done on a
Tuesday’. Crucially, they are too internally diverse in terms of the kind of justification
that is required—something we may express in terms of the default-and-challenge
model by saying that the norms of challenge vary from context to context. The
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(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
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Cartesian sceptic may possibly go in for his peculiar style of challenge in the strictly
‘epistemological context’, but not in other contexts. To do so would, as ever,
constitute a mistake at the level of norms of default-and-challenge governing our
epistemic practice, but more importantly perhaps, it would be an enactment of the
false piece of theory that is epistemological realism. The Cartesian sceptic wants to
move from (i) discovering that, in context C, knowledge is impossible, to (ii)
discovering (in context C) that knowledge is impossible10, but if he can only make
that move by way of the false doctrine of epistemological realism—a staging-post
which would effectively privilege the so-called ‘epistemological context’ over all
others—then the move is blocked and, qua sceptic, he is confined to the study. That
is, his eccentric style of justificational challenge is confined to the context of inquiry
that is peculiar to a certain style of epistemology.
Thus Williams’ fascinating anti-sceptical case. I have so far discussed (and
slightly elaborated) the use he makes, in his recent paper, of default-and-challenge
against Agrippan scepticism; and I have recalled (as he does) the contextualist
position he argues for in Unnatural Doubts, where it functions as the antidote to the
sceptic’s epistemological realism. My chief purpose here, however, is to make a case
for the expansion of our philosophical conception of epistemic subjects and their
activities along a certain temporal dimension, namely, the genealogical temporal
dimension. So how might a genealogy of knowledge help bolster and augment
Williams’ anti-sceptical case?
3. Expanding Along The Temporal Dimension—Genealogical Time
In Edward Craig’s Knowledge and The State of Nature he gives what I’m calling a
genealogical account of knowledge. That is, he tells a State of Nature story about why
we have the concept of knowledge—a ‘practical explication’ of that concept. He
envisages a minimally social epistemic community—an abstraction of any real human
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community, though one that non-accidentally resembles what a real early human
community might have been like in respect of its social simplicity and its hand-to-
mouth relation to basic human needs and dangers. The basic epistemic needs that
define the State of Nature are, first, the need for enough truths (and not too many
falsehoods) for other sorts of basic needs—principally survival needs—to be met. A
community that survives in the State of Nature must operate with sufficient truths to
hunt and/or forage for food, take care of the young, avoid predators, deal with the
dead, and so on. That first epistemic need immediately gives rise to a second: the need
to realize the epistemic and practical advantages of pooling information. Why rely
only on one’s own eyes and ears when you can benefit from the eyes and ears of
others? From where you’re standing you may not be able to see if the predator is
coming, but your colleague up the tree might, and this exemplifies the fundamental
practical pressure to stand in co-operative epistemic relations with fellow inquirers.
Finally, this second epistemic need spontaneously gives rise to a third: the need to
distinguish good from bad informants, so that it is indeed information that gets shared
and not misinformation or disinformation. Human beings, however described, are
fallible—hence the risk of misinformation. And human beings in the State of Nature,
as anywhere else, operate under pressures (such as competition for resources) that
create motivations for deception—hence the risk of disinformation. Distinguishing
good informants is indeed an essential fundamental capacity.
This trio of fundamental epistemic needs generates a certain point of view for
our social epistemological project: the point of view of the inquirer. This is notably
different from the point of view normally taken up in epistemology, namely that of
the examiner; a point of view typified by the epistemologist’s remove from the actual
business of inquiry in order to debate about whether some candidate-knower really
qualifies.11 The particular need to distinguish a good informant as to a given question
whether p is a need had only by someone who doesn’t know whether p but wants to.
Accordingly, as we construct the epistemic State of Nature, we find that ignorance
and the desire to make it good with good information emerge as our basic epistemic
state. In this sense, ‘Who knows whether p?’ is our most basic epistemological
                                                
11 This distinction was first made by Bernard Williams, as Craig notes. See Williams
‘Deciding to Believe’ in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 (1973); 146.
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question, a question that pre-supposes the possibility of knowledge. How far this
broad anti-sceptical presupposition has any argumentative power depends upon how
convincing the overall story is in terms of its explanatory power. In so far as the State
of Nature construction provides a convincing explanatory story about why we have,
of necessity, the concept of knowledge, then so far may it turn out to give genuine
independent support to the idea that sceptical questions are parasitic on there being a
functional epistemic practice in which knowledge is possessed and, in particular,
shared or ‘commoned’12 in an epistemic community. (I shall return to this in section
3.3.)
So how does Craig’s genealogy explain the advent of the concept of
knowledge? We have seen that the inquirer needs to distinguish good informants. A
good informant is someone who: (1) is likely enough in the context to be right about
whether p, (2) is communicatively available and open (including sincere), and (3)
bears indicator properties so that you can reliably recognize that (1) and (2) are
satisfied.13 In Craig’s story, indicator properties will be a mixed bag, but might
standardly include properties such as having been looking in the right direction, or
having a good track record.14 Craig’s thesis is that the constructed concept of the good
informant constitutes the core of our actual concept of a knower. As we might put it,
the status of being a knower starts life as the status of being a good informant. The
two concepts are not co-extensive of course: there can be knowers who are not good
informants, for instance because they lack the requisite indicator properties, or
because the indicator properties (being only reliable) unluckily mislead on that
occasion. But Craig’s proposal is that the functional origin of the concept of
knowledge is to identify good informants, and thereafter the constraints of
                                                
12 This is Michael Welbourne’s term for it. See his Knowledge (Chesham, Bucks: Acumen,
2001) especially chapter 6; and The Community of Knowledge (Aberdeen: Aberdeen
University Press, 1986).
13 Here I paraphrase somewhat but intend to capture Craig’s conditions. For his own
formulation, see Knowledge and the State of Nature, 85.
14 Properties such as these bestow what Bernard Williams, in his genealogy of truthfulness
(modelled closely on Craig’s genealogy of knowledge) calls ‘purely positional advantage’.
See Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002); 42-43.
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recognizability and communicative openness gradually become relaxed, so that we
come to think of knowledge as something objective that another person can possess,
even if we can’t recognize it, or they aren’t coming out with it.15
3.1 The Original Synthesis of Internalist and Externalist Insights:
According to Craig’s genealogy, then, we start to operate with the concept of
knowledge, of necessity, because at the core of that concept is something that meets
the absolutely basic epistemic need to pick out good informants. Now how does all
this help the socializing anti-sceptical case that Williams builds on default-and-
challenge? One of the key anti-sceptical features of default-and-challenge is that it
achieves a desirable combination of internalist and externalist features. I think we can
see how this is explained and so reinforced if we look closely enough at epistemic
practices in the State of Nature. In the first instance, the practice of pooling
information in the State of Nature figures people spotting others as good informants
before asking them for information. But we can see how the basic need for good
information also drives a modification of that practice; namely, asking candidate good
informants for the information one wants, and then, after the fact of utterance,
quizzing them a little as to their reasons. The capacity to give reasons for what one
asserts is a supremely important indicator property, not discussed by Craig. The
person who asserts but does not know may be suspiciously fuzzy on her reasons; the
person who asserts what he knows to be false may be suspiciously unconvincing
when he pretends to give his reasons for his pretend belief.
Being able to supply a justification when challenged is not a necessary
condition of being a good informant. Rightly not, for what primarily matters to the
inquirer is simply that the good informant comes out with the truth on demand; not
that he comes out with his reasons as well. Given that the inquirer can spot a good
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informant to his own satisfaction, she will just take the information and not bother to
quiz him further about his reasons. However, this basic practice established, we can
immediately see how quickly an informant’s capacity to give reasons assumes
importance, for it is highly desirable in a good informant that he be able to produce
reasons when challenged, owing to the fact that this may be by far the best indicator
property available to the inquirer. The same point applies individualistically too, for
inquirers in the State of Nature will often be relying on the deliverances of their own
faculties, and are best construed as entitled to trust them unless they have some reason
not to—a foggy day, a foggy memory.16 (Here we glimpse the nascent default-and-
challenge structure of justification emerging.) On these occasions, a certain challenge
to self is in order, which amounts to a demand for an after-the-fact indicator property
that one is likely enough in the context to be right about p. The ability to produce a
satisfying reason is the prime case of such an indicator property.
The importance of this capacity to come out with reasons when challenged,
combined with the fact that it is not one of the conditions of qualifying as a good
informant, explains what underpins the desired admixture of internalist and externalist
features that Williams aims to achieve in his responsibilist position. The picture in the
State of Nature is fundamentally externalist—what matters is simply that good
informants come out with the truth—but then we see very clearly the origin of
internalist intuitions about knowledge. On the story I am urging here, we agree with
Craig that the good informant’s capacity to access his reasons is not at the core of the
concept of knowledge; but, we add, it does feature in a layer of content that is close to
core. It is not a merely peripheral feature, resulting from a mere contingency in how
we operate with the concept. The importance of the capacity to produce reasons in
support of what one believes flows immediately from the basic method of identifying
good informants that constitutes the core. I think this is a good way of substantiating
the two-sided thought that it is close to conceptually impossible that a human being
who lacked the general capacity to come out with reasons for their beliefs could count
as a knower (or even a believer); but being able to come out with one’s reasons is not
thereby a necessary condition of knowledge. This combining of externalist and
internalist features of the practice of justification on the part of good informants in the
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State of Nature echoes and substantiates the internalist-externalist combination we
find in default-and-challenge. On that model of justification, the subject can have
knowledge even if she has taken the deliverances of her faculties entirely at face value
and cannot produce any positive reason for her belief. If faced with an eccentric
challenge, she may only be able to assert that it never occurred to her to wonder; she
may even be a bit thrown by the fact of the challenge and by her own bewildered
reaction. And yet, according to default-and-challenge, the fact that the default did
indeed hold is sufficient. The kind of responsibilism Williams’ arguments are
designed to achieve, I think, is one that allows externalism vis-à-vis the question
whether the default of entitlement holds, so that the subject need not at any point be
reflectively aware that it holds; yet internalism when it comes to the subject’s
obligation to respond to contextually appropriate challenge. My suggestion has been
that a responsibilism of that combinatory sort finds explanatory support in the
genealogical approach.
3.2 Practical Origins of Contextualism:
What about contextualism?—something that can be considered part and parcel of the
default-and-challenge model of justification (but which Williams argues for
independently in Unnatural Doubts?17). I suggest that this too finds significant origin
in the State of Nature. We have seen that the inquirer is looking for someone who is,
among other things, likely enough in the context to be right as to whether p. This
presents an explicitly contextualist picture of its own, according to which what it
takes to be a good informant—and so what it takes to play the social role at the core
of knowing—alters from context to context. For instance, if the stakes are very high,
the good informant will need to approach certainty, though always within the bounds
of practicality; if they are not so high, she might count as likely enough to be right
about p just by being reasonably sure; if they are lower still, or if perhaps there is a
certain practical urgency and/or simply no one else to ask, then a 51% chance of her
being right might even suffice. This contextualist picture—driven entirely by practical
concerns—imposes certain constraints on the inquirer. If, in our imagined scenario, in
                                                
17 Unnatural Doubts was published prior to Brandom’s Making It Explicit in which the
default-and-challenge model is introduced. I thank Alessandra Tanesini for pointing out the
significance of this.
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which the inquirer has already asked a candidate good informant for information, the
informant has told her something, and she is challenging him for his reasons, then her
challenges must be appropriately geared to the context. She is looking for an after-
the-fact-of-utterance indicator property, and this means that if she presses him for the
sort of justification that exceeds the contextually required level of probability that he
is right about p, then this marks a dysfunction in her epistemic conduct from her own
point of view as an inquirer. At the extreme, she may be so busy pressing potential
informants for reasons, that she gets attacked by the predator her erstwhile informant
was trying to warn her about. Basic practical concerns generate the context-sensitive
norms of default-and-challenge in the State of Nature, so that inquirers who demand
reasons above and beyond those appropriate to the context are making a mistake at
the level of the (emergent) norms of justification.
How does this natural contextualism relate to the contextualism argued for by
Williams? On the face of it, they are not quite the same. Williams argues for
contextualism primarily by invoking Wittgenstein’s idea of hinge propositions, so that
the chief argument is that all contexts of inquiry (except perhaps the epistemological
context) require that certain things be taken for granted, as a matter of methodological
necessity.18 Talk of hinge propositions, and the different methodological disciplines
of different contexts of inquiry can make it seem as if Williams’ contextualism relates
exclusively to more formally defined and/or institutionally organized forms of
inquiry, paradigmatically academic disciplines such as ‘science’ or ‘history’. But this
is not so, for the notion of methodological necessity in play here is generic. Williams
talks quite generally, for instance, of propositions’ epistemic status being ‘interest-
relative’19; and explicitly applies his contextualism not only to ‘highly organized
forms of inquiry’ but also to ‘more informal, everyday settings’:
I have introduced the idea of a proposition’s being exempted from doubt as a matter
of methodological necessity in connection with the disciplinary constraints that
                                                
18 I thank Duncan Pritchard for a comment that made me see the need to be specific about
how the contextualism generated in the State of Nature relates to Williams’ own.
19 ‘If a proposition’s epistemic status is determined by the direction of inquiry, its status is
interest-relative’ (Unnatural Doubts; 124).
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determine the general directions of highly organized forms of inquiry. But it is
evident that something similar goes on in more informal, everyday settings. Asking
some questions logically precludes asking others: all sorts of everyday certainties
have to stand fast if we are to get on with life… We are therefore determined by
Nature to hold certain things fast only in so far as we are naturally inclined to interest
ourselves in matters requiring us to exempt them from doubt.20
It is this generic methodological insight that I have suggested we find already up and
running in the State of Nature. Perhaps one could represent the State of Nature as
supplying one and only one context of inquiry, namely the practical context of
inquiry. I would not disagree with that in itself; but it would be arbitrary to insist on
the integrity of something called ‘the practical context’ if that amounted to an
insistence of lack of contextual differentiation within the practical. On the contrary,
the State of Nature supplies a range of practical contexts, each of which has its own
methodologically necessary certainties, as imposed by the contextually generated
requisite level of probability that the informant is right about p. For example, if
someone with a decent track record when it comes to taking care of the sick tells one
that putting maggots on a festering wound is a good way of cleaning it and staving off
gangrene, the practical exigencies of the context (one’s got to do something, there’s
no obvious reason to distrust him, and so on) mean that being justified in believing
him does not require ruling out, for instance, that he recently suffered a blow to the
head that has scrambled all his proto-medical knowledge. If your are going to get on
with taking care of your wound, then you simply have to take such distant
possibilities for granted—as a matter of methodological necessity. I think this is
enough to show that the practical pressures that generate contextualism in the State of
Nature lend significant explanatory support to the contextualism that Williams
embraces, even while we can also see that they might lend equal support to slightly
different forms of contextualism. That is entirely as it should be, for the State of
Nature scenario contains only the necessary features of our practices. We should not
hope to find anything but the core of our actual justificatory practices there, and so
should not hope to extrapolate anything more than a generic contextualist theoretical
commitment.
                                                
20 Williams, Unnatural Doubts; 123.
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3.3 The Un-Originality of Sceptical Challenge
In this exploration of the practical pressures that generate contextualism in the State
of Nature, we already begin to see how the genealogy of knowledge provides
independent support for the anti-sceptical purpose to which Williams puts his own
contextualist position. There are no sceptics in the State of Nature—survival requires
taking some people as knowing things one needs to know, and that entails accepting
the possibility of knowledge. This underpins my earlier suggestion that Williams’
charge against the Agrippan sceptic—that he behaves in a contextually inappropriate
way, where his conduct is driven by a mistaken theory of justification—does have
some significant force against the Cartesian sceptic too. In the State of Nature, it
doesn’t matter in which style sceptical challenges are made. The fact that any such
challenges make demands that exceed what it takes for the informant to be likely
enough in the context to be right about p means the sceptic will fail to identify good
informants that are staring him in the face, and will be disadvantaged by it. This
means that not only the Agrippan demand for ultimate justification but also the
Cartesian demand for absolute certainty can only be a mistake. The Cartesian makes
the selfsame two-fold mistake made by the Agrippan: a mistake at the level of norms
of justification on the ground, driven by a mistake at the level of the philosophy of
justification. In fact, our genealogical story most directly undermines scepticism of
precisely the Cartesian sort, for the Cartesian’s trademark aim is to demonstrate that
we cannot meet his demand for absolute certainty, and that demand is just what the
natural contextualism generated in the State of Nature exposes as fatally misguided.
The State of Nature, then, explains the commonsense idea that no one can basically
be a sceptic. They must be inquirer first, and sceptic second; someone committed to
the practical possibility of knowledge first, and committed to undermining that
possibility second. This of course leaves room for the idea that there may yet be a
context in which it is appropriate to mount sceptical challenges. We do not find such a
context in the State of Nature, but there might yet be such.
This accommodating thought prompts exposure of the other respect in which
we can see the genealogy of knowledge lending independent support to Williams’
anti-sceptical strategy. The point of extending our philosophical conception over the
semi-fictional time in which genealogical narratives are set, is that it provides an
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invaluable way of relating core features of a concept to non-core or peripheral
features. I know of no other philosophical method that provides the opportunity to
relate original, necessary features of a concept to less basic, more
contingent—historically contingent—features.21 Accordingly, it delivers an entirely
different image of concepts than that issued by the analytical method. The analytical
ambition and attendant philosophical imagination generates an image of concepts as
like molecules, ready for their different elemental components to be separated out by
the philosopher acting in her capacity as conceptual chemist. Genealogical method, by
contrast, brings with it an image of core and periphery, or kernel and outer
layers—the kernel presents necessary features of the concept, and the outer layers
increasingly contingent historical features. These layers may be separated out from
the kernel by the philosopher acting in her capacity as something more like
conceptual historian. The necessity of the core features stands or falls with how
convincingly the story passes muster as a pure construction out of nothing but
absolutely basic needs. If, however unwittingly, one includes a contingent feature in
the State of Nature scenario, perhaps to suit one’s philosophical purpose, then,
clearly, the story will not be convincing. No doubt every story of origins should be
accompanied by something of a health warning, for it surely is all too easy to craft the
State of Nature in one’s philosophically preferred image. As Foucault scoffingly
warns us, echoing what he takes to be Nietzsche’s own warning about the
philosopher’s fantasy of the origin:
History is the concrete body of a development, with its moments of intensity, its
lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells; and only a
metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of the origin.22
But Foucault is wrong if he equates all origins stories with ahistorical fantasy. One of
the great virtues of the State of Nature method is precisely its separation of features of
a concept that bear the necessity of the origin, from features that are a contingent
                                                
21 Bernard Williams exploits this facility in Truth and Truthfulness by identifying in the State
of Nature his two fundamental virtues of truth—Accuracy and Sincerity—and then going on
to explore their contingent historical forms and significances.
22 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, The Foucault Reader: An Introduction
To Foucault’s Thought, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1984); 80.
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matter of history. And it is entirely clear that the claim of necessity is grounded not on
anything metaphysical, but rather on something fundamentally practical—the
practical human necessity of the materials used to construct the State of Nature
scenario. If we find there is nothing in the posited original human need to pool
information that strikes us as merely contingent—if, that is, we cannot make sense of
the idea that there could be a recognizably human society absent this most basic form
of epistemic co-operation—then the idea that identifying good informants comprises
the kernel of the concept of knowledge has significant force. The relevant counter-
claim that with concepts, all is history and nothing origin, is quixotic prejudice.
Craig’s State of Nature story reveals that if there is a context of inquiry in
which sceptical challenges are appropriate, still there are nonesuch in the State of
Nature. And from this we have drawn the inference that sceptics must be inquirers
first and sceptics second (or, basically inquirers, and sceptics only superficially). This,
in its own right, blocks the sceptic’s colonizing move from (i) discovering that, in
context C, knowledge is impossible, to (ii) discovering (in context C) that knowledge
is impossible. What blocks scepticism, then, is not only the falsity of epistemological
realism, but also the genealogical primacy of practical, knowledge-permitting,
contexts of inquiry. These knowledge-permitting contexts are the contexts in which
the core of the concept of knowledge is dramatized in practices of good informing. In
this sense, knowledge-permitting contexts figure at the core of the concept of
knowledge; indeed they exhaust it, for there are no other contexts in the State of
Nature. Thus the possibility of knowledge is prior to the possibility of sceptical
challenge in the special sense that can only be supplied by imaginatively stretching
our concepts of knowledge and justification across genealogical time: even the sceptic
cannot escape the cognitive functionality of the origin, for that scenario is still with
us, at the core of what it is for us to know.
As in Williams’ irenic anti-sceptical strategy, this may still leave some room
for a confined practice of sceptical challenge—it is only in the State of Nature that
sceptics are, so to speak, extinct. In the real-time practices of default-and-challenge
there may possibly remain a context in which sceptical challenge is appropriate, so
that knowledge is not possible in that context. But such an ‘epistemological context’,
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if there be such23, exploits only aspects of the concept of knowledge that are way out
on the periphery. And our genealogy has exposed the extreme contingency of any
such sceptical practice, so that the sceptic may at any time find that the locks to his
comfortable study have been changed and that it is now being put to a different
philosophical use. Thus genealogical time has implications for historical real time:
while the diagnosis of the sceptical urge goes deep in philosophy, our genealogy of
knowledge reveals that the question of the propriety of sceptical challenge does not go
deep. It simply rests on how much nurturance we continue to give to the context of
inquiry in which sceptical challenge is deemed appropriate. That is, it rests on
something social within the philosophical community: namely, how far we continue
to respond to sceptical challenge in the epistemological context as justified challenge;
or, putting it another way, how far we continue to sustain the ‘epistemological
context’. Perhaps only a satisfactory theoretical diagnosis can entitle us to ignore
sceptical challenge; and that may ultimately be something that Williams’s arguments
help to achieve. For my part, I have tried to show that the genealogical approach
contributes an independent diagnostic strategy, which can be seen to support and
substantiate the main strands of Williams’ anti-sceptical case, and also to provide its
own distinctive style of directly anti-sceptical argument. Most generally, I hope to
have shown how social epistemology may be fruitfully expanded not only across
social space but also across time.
Miranda Fricker
Birkbeck College
                                                
23 ‘Epistemological context’ seems too generous a category, precisely because there are
already approaches to epistemology that pre-empt, or at least do not invite, sceptical
challenge.
